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Chapter 2 
State Support for Religions: European Regulation 
Françoise Curtit and Anne Fornerod1
The issue of public funding for religions in Europe deals mainly with the various 
mechanisms put in place by domestic legal systems. However, in addition to financial 
relationships between the State and religions, we should take into account the European level 
as a regulatory framework. European Union policy, as well as European Court of Human 
Rights case law, could indeed affect state support for religions. The first section of this paper 
will examine European Union tax policy on funding religious organizations, while the second 
section will analyze the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in this field. 
 
European Union Tax Policy and Financial Relationships between States and Religions 
Religious issues do not fall within European Union competence and in this respect 
Member State sovereignty continues to prevail.2
                                                          
1 UMR DRES 7354 - Droits et religions, CNRS / University of Strasbourg. 
 In various areas, European Union law 
nevertheless provides exemptions from rules of general applicability to preserve the existing 
domestic provisions relating to the organizational autonomy of religious communities and to 
their role in society (processing of sensitive data, labour law for organizations with an ethos 
based on religion or belief, ritual slaughter …). In these cases, religion is clearly 
distinguishable from economic activities and requires protection against market forces or 
economic regulation. On the other hand, if religious organizations are to be considered as 
serving economic purposes, they are subject to the same rules and principles as any other 
entities, particularly as regards public funding and state aid. 
2 See Article 17 § 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [30.03.2010] OJ C 83: ‘The Union 
respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or 
communities in the Member States.’ 
In this context, European Union regulation of Member States’ tax policies could affect 
state support for religions, and we intend to show how European Union tax rules and the 
powers of investigation of the European Commission could interfere in, and even influence, 
financial relationships between tates and religions. 
The European Union’s Role in Tax Coordination 
Tax policy itself falls mainly within the competence of Member States, which may provide 
support for religions, in particular by granting them specific tax reliefs. However, the 
European Union plays a subsidiary role of tax coordination (and harmonization for value 
added tax) to maintain the fairness and balance of Member States’ tax systems. In fact, the 
European Commission checks that national tax systems are compatible not only with each 
other, but also with the aims of the treaties, by ensuring that taxation (or non-taxation) does 
not create an obstacle to the free movement of goods and the free supply of services within 
the internal market. European Union law contains very few legal provisions relating to tax 
measures for religious activities and institutions. 
Firstly, one could mention Article 103 of Regulation 1186/20093
Secondly, and more relevant to our subject, the Value Added Tax (VAT) Directive 
2006/112
, which provides that 
documentation for religious events (leaflets, books, magazines …) shall be free of import 
duties – which clearly has a very minor impact on funding for religions. 
4
                                                          
3 Council Regulation (EC) 1186/2009 of 16 November 2009 setting up a Community system of reliefs from 
customs duty [10.12.2009] OJ L324, p. 23. 
 obliges a Member State to tax supplies of goods and services as long as no specific 
exemption is provided. Public interest exemptions are strictly listed under Articles 132 and 
133, relating in particular to welfare, social, medical or educational activities undertaken by 
4 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax [11.12.2006] 
OJ L347, p. 1. 
bodies governed by public law and by non-profit organizations. VAT has to be harmonized at 
European Union level in order to ensure that goods and services can move freely and without 
hindrance between Member States, and exemptions constitute exceptions which must be 
strictly interpreted5
European Union Investigative Power and Infringement Procedures: Recent Cases 
. The impact of this directive and the ‘Europeanization’ of tax policy will 
be discussed further below. 
The European Union single market is the cornerstone of European integration. As guardian 
of the treaties, the European Commission ensures that competition is not distorted and 
promotes the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. The Commission could, 
for example, control if state aid or taxation/non-taxation of activities are anti-competitive. To 
this end, the Commission has investigative powers, wielded at its own initiative or in response 
to a government request or an individual complainant. If the Commission detects a failure to 
comply with European Union law, it may initiate an infringement procedure (Article 258 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) comprising several stages. At the 
beginning, the Commission sends the Member State concerned a letter of formal notice 
inviting it to submit its observations within two months and most differences of opinion are 
settled during this first stage. Otherwise, the Commission may issue a reasoned opinion, 
allowing the Member State an additional two-month period within which to comply. At the 
end, if the Member State fails to conform to European Union law, the Commission can refer 
the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Up to now, no case law has been 
brought before the Court relating to domestic tax systems as applied to churches and religious 
organizations. The Commission has recently opened a handful of investigations and 
proceedings in this area, involving Spain, Italy and, more recently, Denmark. Here, we will 
present the most significant of these. 
                                                          
5 See case C–284/03 Temco Europe [2004] ECR I–0000, pt 17. 
VAT exemption in favour of the Catholic Church in Spain 
The European Commission decided in December 2005 to issue a formal request to Spain to 
amend value added tax treatment of supplies of goods made to the Catholic Church (for 
example Episcopal Conference, dioceses, parishes and other territorial constituencies, orders 
and religious congregations …). Spain maintains that the Agreement between the Spanish 
State and the Holy See on Economic Affairs of 3 January 19796, Article 4 1. B), obliges it to 
exempt from VAT certain supplies of goods (imports and acquisitions of movables and 
immovables) to the Catholic Church.7 Such an exemption is not authorized under the 
European Union VAT system (according to the VAT Directive), even if the State makes a 
positive adjustment to the revenue. The Commission pointed out that the second paragraph of 
Article 307 of the European Community Treaty8 obliges Spain – to the extent that the 
agreement is not compatible with the European Community Treaty – to ‘take all appropriate 
steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. This would even, following the case law 
of the European Court of Justice, include denunciation of the Agreement’.9
                                                          
6 Instrumento de ratificación del Acuerdo entre el Estado español y la Santa Sede sobre asuntos económicos, 
firmado en la Ciudad del Vaticano el 3 de enero de 1979 [15.12.1979] BOE 300, p. 28782. 
 
7 Press release IP/05/1620 of 16 December 2005, ‘VAT – Commission asks Spain to amend treatment of 
supplies of goods made to the Catholic Church’. 
8 Now, Article 351 TFEU: ‘The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 
or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand, 
and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties. To the extent 
that such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the Member State or States concerned shall take all 
appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where necessary, assist 
each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude …’ 
9 Press release IP/05/1620, op. cit. 
The Spanish Episcopal Conference and the Spanish government started negotiations and 
finally reached an agreement on funding the Church: from 1 January 2007, VAT exemptions 
were no longer to apply to the operations of the Catholic Church (except as provided by 
European Union tax law). The Commission had made it clear that this does not prevent Spain 
from paying financial compensation to the Catholic Church in return for VAT that the Church 
has to pay to the Spanish tax authorities.10 In this regard, the Spanish Government chose to 
revise the state’s tax allocation to the Catholic Church from 0.52 per cent to 0.70 per cent of 
the entire income tax revenue received from private individuals.11
ICIO exemption in favour of the Catholic Church in Spain 
 
In 2007, a second investigation was initiated against Spain to review the Catholic Church’s 
exemption from the ‘Tax on construction, installation and repairs’ (Impuesto sobre 
construcciones, instalaciones y obras, ICIO),12 a municipal tax on building works requiring 
permits. This exemption was granted by a ministerial order of 5 June 2001,13
This exemption also applied where constructions, installations or repairs were related to 
activities having nothing to do with worship, sometimes of a purely commercial nature. Here, 
the Church could be in competition with economic entities, (companies …) which had to pay 
 a legal provision 
also pursuant to Article 4 1. B) of the Agreement of 3 January 1979 between the Spanish State 
and the Holy See. 
                                                          
10 Ibidem. 
11 Ley 42/2006, de 28 de diciembre, de Presupuestos Generales del Estado para el año 2007. Disposición 
adicional decimoctava. Revisión del sistema de asignación tributaria a la Iglesia Católica [29.12.2006] BOE 311. 
12 See Parliamentary questions: E–2578/06 of 12 June 2006 [30.12.2006] OJ C329; E–0829/07 of 20 February 
2007 [5.12.2007] OJ C293; E–0774/08 of 18 February 2008 [13.11.2008] OJ C291. 
13 Orden de 5 de junio de 2001 por la que se aclara la inclusión del Impuesto sobre Construcciones, Instalaciones 
y Obras en la letra B) del apartado 1 del artículo IV del Acuerdo entre el Estado Español y la Santa Sede sobre 
asuntos económicos, de 3 de enero de 1979 [16.06.2001] BOE 144, p. 21427. 
tax and enjoyed no exemption. As the status of the supplier determines whether the activity is 
taxable or non-taxable, it may create distortions of competition. The Commission considered 
that this exemption was therefore a form of state aid,14 incompatible with the common market 
since it distorts or falsifies competition, favouring bodies of the Catholic Church and being 
prejudicial to other Spanish or European businesses carrying out buildings or repairs for 
similar purposes.15
In 2009, the Spanish Government amended the legislation to eliminate any incompatibility 
between this tax exemption and European Union state aid rules.
 
16 The Spanish proposal 
consisted in limiting the scope of the ICIO exemption to real estate which is clearly used for 
religious purposes and is thus unrelated to an economic activity. For this reason, the European 
Commission considered that the Spanish proposal has satisfied its request, since it only covers 
buildings the use of which is outside the scope of rules on state aid.17
Both cases in Spain have thereby been closed, as have other more recent cases in Italy. 
Acting upon complaints in relation to undertakings received from 2006, the European 
Commission sent several requests for information to the Italian authorities and in 2010 finally 
opened formal investigation proceedings related to two types of tax exemption.  
 
                                                          
14 Article 107 § 1 TFUE: ‘1. Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, 
be incompatible with the internal market.’ 
15 Parliamentary question E–2578/06 of 12 June 2006 [30.12.2006] OJ C329. 
16 Orden EHA/2814/2009, de 15 de octubre, por la que se modifica la Orden de 5 de junio de 2001, por la que se 
aclara la inclusión del Impuesto sobre Construcciones, Instalaciones y Obras en la letra B) del apartado 1 del 
artículo IV del Acuerdo entre el Estado Español y la Santa Sede sobre asuntos económicos, de 3 de enero de 
1979 [21.10.2009] BOE 254, p. 88046. 
17 Parliamentary questions P–1628/2009 of 15 April 2009 [13.07.2010] OJ C189. 
Tax exemption from the municipal tax on real estate in Italy18
The first procedure relates to a municipal tax (Imposta comunale sugli immobili, ICI) 
exemption, which is granted on real estate used by non-commercial entities which exclusively 
fulfil specific purposes: activities such as social assistance, welfare, health … and religious 
and worship activities.
 
19 An entity can enjoy this exemption only if its commercial activities 
are non-prevalent: if they are neither marginal, nor directly related to the activity of worship, 
it will not benefit from the exemption. A circular from the Finance Ministry dated 26 January 
200920
The Commission considers that this tax exemption could constitute illegal state aid and 
therefore distort competition, because it constitutes an advantage for these organizations in 
comparison with commercial entities which provide the same activity. For instance, health-
care or accommodation services provided by ecclesiastic institutions are in competition with 
similar services offered by economic operators.
 states that ecclesiastical organizations legally recognized according to the Lateran 
Treaty or agreements between the Italian State and other denominations are included among 
private, non-commercial entities. 
21
                                                          
18 State aid C 26/10 (ex NN 43/10) – Scheme concerning the municipal real estate tax exemption granted to real 
estate used by non-commercial entities for specific purposes. Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 
108 § 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (text with EEA relevance) (2010/C 348/11), 
[21.12.2010] OJ C348, p. 17. 
 Furthermore, the Commission considers that 
non-commercial entities may perform, in certain cases, economic activities and ‘[a]t this stage 
of the procedure, [it] also considers that the criteria used by the Circolare in order to exclude 
19 Decreto legislativo n. 504, 30 dicembre 1992, Article 7 § 1 i), [30.12.1992], G.U. 305, suppl. ord. 
20 Circolare 26 gennaio 2009, n. 2, del Ministero delle Finanze, Imposta comunale sugli immobili (ICI), Article 
7, comma 1, lettera i), del D. Lgs. 30 dicembre 1992, n. 504. 
21 State aid C 26/10, op. cit., pt 54. 
the commercial nature (under Italian law) of the activities listed in Article 7 i) cannot exclude 
the economic nature (under European competition law) of these activities’.22
In early 2012, the ICI was replaced by the IMU (Imposta municipale unitaria), and the 
Monti government drafted an amendment
 
23
The European Commission has therefore closed its investigation, considering that, under 
these limitations, the IMU is in line with European Union state aid rules.
 which provides that, in case of mixed commercial 
and non-profit use of the same building, the exemption will be strictly limited to the fraction 
of the property in which non-commercial activities take place. A declaration mechanism is 
also planned so as to identify the proportional relationship between commercial and non-
commercial activities performed within the same building. 
24
Italian Unified Law on income tax: ecclesiastic institutions can never lose their non-
commercial status
 
25
As part of the same procedure, the Commission also investigated Article 149 4) of the 
Italian Unified Law on Income Tax (Testo unico delle imposte sui redditi, TUIR)
 
26
                                                          
22 State aid C 26/10, op. cit., pt 38 [emphasis added]. 
 which 
provides favourable tax treatment for ecclesiastic institutions and amateur sports clubs. This 
law lays down the tax advantages applicable to non-commercial entities and identifies the 
23 Decreto-legge 24 gennaio 2012, n. 1, coordinato con la legge di conversione 24 marzo 2012, n. 27, 
Disposizioni urgenti per la concorrenza, lo sviluppo delle infrastrutture e la competitivita, Article 91–bis, 
[24.3.2012] G.U. 71, suppl. ord. 53. 
24 Press release IP/12/1412 of 19 December 2012, ‘State aid : Commission finds Italian ICI real estate tax 
exemptions for non-commercial entities incompatible and clears amended exemptions under new IMU law’. 
25 Press release IP10/1319 of 12 October 2010, ‘State aid: Commission opens probe into preferential real estate 
tax regime for non commercial entities in Italy’. 
26 Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica, 22 dicembre 1986, n. 917 – Approvazione del Testo unico delle 
imposte sui redditi [31.12.1986] G.U. 302, (Article 149 was introduced in 1998). 
conditions that can lead to the loss of the ‘non-commercial status’ of an entity. The provision 
of Article 149 4) appeared to exclude the application of the rules concerning the loss of ‘non-
commercial status’ for ecclesiastic institutions with a civil status, even if they carry out 
commercial activities. ‘As regards Article 149 4) TUIR, at this stage the Commission 
considers that the provision constitutes prima facie a selective measure, since the possibility 
to maintain the non-commercial status even when they would otherwise no longer be 
considered as non-commercial entities is granted only to ecclesiastic institutions and to 
amateur sport clubs.’27
But here again, the European Commission has closed its investigation. It had finally 
revealed ‘that the controls carried out by the competent authorities include these entities and 
that there is no system of “perpetual non-commercial status”’.
 
28
VAT exemption for charitable and non-profit making associations’ supplies in Denmark 
 
Finally, mention should be made of a last, pending case related to Denmark. Danish 
authorities exempt from VAT all supplies carried out by charities or other non-profit 
associations (including religious organizations) in connection with their running businesses, 
as well as goods supplied by second-hand shops. In 2008, the European Commission sent a 
formal notice to Denmark29
                                                          
27 State aid C 26/10, op. cit., pt 56. 
 and stated that such a general exemption goes beyond what is 
allowed under Article 132 of the VAT Directive, which contains a detailed, restrictive 
description of the activities that can be exempted, as well as certain conditions related to the 
exemption. In 2010, the procedure continues as a reasoned opinion and the Commission has 
28 Press release IP/12/1412, op. cit. 
29 Press release IP/10/90 of 28 January 2010, ‘VAT – Commission pursues infringement proceedings against 
Denmark regarding VAT exemptions’. 
formally requested Denmark to change the law regarding the application of these exemptions. 
It is a recent, ongoing investigation and further information should be forthcoming. 
Towards a New Funding Model in the Member States? 
We will try to draw some conclusions from these few infringement cases, in order to assess 
factors involved in the emerging patterns of state support for religions. 
Does the European Union interfere in the financial relationships between States and 
religions? 
The European Union acts strictly within the limits of its competences conferred by the 
treaties (single market, competition, state aid …) and does not want to deal more precisely 
with state funding of religious institutions.30
A ‘banalization’ of religious organizations? 
 Its intervention on the matter mainly involves 
checking the implementation of European Union tax law within domestic legislation. 
Moreover, without needing to refer to the Court of Justice, at least for religion-related cases, 
the Commission succeeded in amending Spanish and Italian tax law, and perhaps soon Danish 
law. Therefore, we can say that the European Union does interfere in financial relationships 
between States and religions, at least as regards tax policy, which represents only one part of 
public support that they receive. 
We can identify two different tax policy approaches among the partners involved. On the 
one hand, Member States could apply differentiated treatment between religious and non-
religious organizations (Catholic Church in Spain, ecclesiastic institutions in Italy) or 
                                                          
30 On the privileged situation of the Catholic Church relating to tax exemption in Spain, the Commission 
responded: ‘ … the Commission would point out that, as Community law stands at present, the financing of 
religious institutions falls entirely within the sphere of competence of the Member States’: Parliamentary 
question P–3773/2002 of 24 January 2003 [10.07.2003] OJ C161E, p. 142. 
between commercial and non-commercial status (non-commercial entities in Italy, non-profit 
associations in Denmark). 
On the other hand, European Union authorities focus their approach on the activities,31 
regardless of the type of organization that carries them out. The justification for the exemption 
here lies in the nature of the tasks, and the status of the supplier cannot determine in itself 
whether the activity is taxable or not. In this regard, the European Union distinguishes more 
specifically between the economic nature and the commercial nature of activities32 and 
considers that non-commercial entities – and among them religious organizations – may 
perform economic activities in various areas (health care, housing, education …). They are 
therefore in competition with other operators offering the same services and fall within the 
scope of state aid rules. Under this broad interpretation and according to the case law 
provided by the European Court of Justice, ‘any activity consisting in offering goods and 
services on a given market’ is an economic activity.33
The European Union plays its role of tax coordination and harmonization in accordance 
with the primacy given to single market and competition rules. In this context, the same law 
applies to all legal entities (profit-making companies, non-profit organizations …): religious 
organizations are economic players like any others. As providers of social services, but also as 
institutions per se, religions are losing their specificities, at least regarding taxation: if the 
Catholic Church is subject to special rules pursuant to an international agreement (Concordat), 
this agreement has to be amended (see supra). In this matter, as in other areas (employment 
 
                                                          
31 See Article 132 of the VAT Directive 2006/112: ‘Member States shall exempt the following transactions …’ 
[emphasis added]. 
32 See supra, concerning the ICI tax in Italy. 
33 See case C–475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner [2001] ECR I–8089, pt 19. 
status of ministers of religion, denominational schools …), the prevailing market logic is 
progressively leading to a ‘banalization’ of religious organizations. 
The European Union’s aim is not to standardize national systems of financing and taxation, 
but European Union law creates a legal framework, an economic context to which Member 
States have to adapt their domestic legislation. In this light, in December 2010 the European 
Commission issued a Green Paper on VAT,34 proposing a comprehensive reform of the VAT 
system, because the existence of numerous options and derogations for Member States under 
European Union VAT law was leading to divergent rules across the European Union and may 
be an obstacle to the better functioning of the single market. There is a need to review these 
exemptions, and to ‘reform the VAT rules in a “single market-friendly way”’.35
‘Coping mechanisms’ 
 After a 
consultation phase, the Commission’s decision on such harmonization could be a new step 
towards fiscal integration into the European Union … and the disappearance of disparities 
within Member States. 
In this European legal context, various tax exceptions for operations of a purely religious 
nature remain possible in Member States, but only if they can strictly be considered as 
activities of social utility or public benefit which cannot distort competition. 
However, this binding framework does not prevent any Member State from adapting its 
own legislation, for instance by implementing a tax refund mechanism (e.g. returning VAT to 
religious organizations or charities …). Various VAT compensation systems are currently in 
operation in Members States (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Portugal, 
                                                          
34 Green Paper on the future of VAT. Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system COM (2010) 695 
final. 
35 Ibidem, p. 5. 
Sweden and UK) for certain public bodies or non-profit organizations.36 As regards religious 
organizations, Portugal, for example, has chosen to operate a VAT refund mechanism, funded 
by the State, compensating various entities, including the Catholic Church. In 1991, the 
European Commission started an infringement procedure against Portugal related to VAT 
exemption for the delivery of objects of worship and for construction, maintenance and 
repairs to buildings belonging to the Catholic Church, intended exclusively for worship.37 The 
Commission recognized that these were not ‘economic activities’, but it was nevertheless a 
breach of the VAT Directive. The Portuguese Government then solved this problem by 
passing a law stating that the Catholic Church would receive in return, every year, a subsidy 
equivalent to the amount of VAT paid. In the United Kingdom, the Listed Places of Worship 
Grant Scheme, provides grants towards the VAT incurred in making repairs and carrying out 
necessary alterations to listed buildings mainly used for public worship. Places of worship 
‘listed’ by Government as architecturally important benefit from the refund of the difference 
between five per cent and the actual amount spent on VAT on eligible repairs and 
maintenance.38
Several reports
 
39
                                                          
36 Copenhagen Economics (2011), VAT in the public sector and exemptions in the public interest: final report for 
Taxud, March 1, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/publications/studies/ 
 suggest extending the VAT refund scheme throughout the European 
Union, especially for charities. This recommendation could be extended to the activities of 
vat_public_sector.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 
37 Decreto lei 20/90 de 13 de Janeiro [13.01.1990] D.R. 1 serie 11, p. 199. 
38 Cranmer, F., Paying the piper? Public financing of religion in a secular society, p. ?? 
39 Copenhagen Economics, VAT in the public sector, op. cit. ISOBRO, Denmark – VAT Compensation Scheme 
for Charities 2006, 28 February 2007, see summary: http://www.ictr.ie/files/Danish Vat Compensation Scheme 
Summary - Feb 2007.pdf, accessed 4 February 2013. 
religious organizations … and perhaps for other categories of taxes, as far as it does not lead 
to competition distortion. 
‘Coping mechanisms’ can thus be implemented in the Member States to ensure compliance 
between national practices and European Union law. This superposition of technical rules and 
complex mechanisms could nevertheless be an additional obstacle to an even greater 
transparency required in the financial relationships between States and religions. In this 
respect, European Union law and domestic legislation have to provide clear and reliable tax 
rules and selection criteria. 
A market–oriented approach for emerging practices in state funding for religions 
Public funding for religions is under pressure on all sides and, in a context of secularization 
of societies, growing pluralism … and economic crisis, it may give rise to contestation within 
the States: ‘privileges’ are no longer applicable to religions, nor among religions. In Italy for 
instance, in summer 2011, a growing number of people were criticizing tax breaks given to 
the Catholic Church, including via an Internet campaign. Protesters were asking for numerous 
exemptions given to the Church to be reviewed and proposing abolition of the otto per mille 
(part of annual income tax revenue, paid to an organized religion or to a social assistance 
project run by the Italian State, mainly benefiting the Catholic Church). Supporters said that 
the tax breaks were justified, because the Catholic Church plays an important role in social 
welfare, but the debate is far from over.40
                                                          
40 Nasi, Margherita, ‘Italie: les privilèges fiscaux de l’Église en question’, Libération, 30 August 2011. And see 
Facebook Vaticano pagaci tu la manovra finanziaria and Ma quali privilegi e ICI? La Chiesa le tasse le paga! 
 In Greece, public controversy emerged in 
September 2011, as the Orthodox Church appeared to be largely exempt from a new property 
tax implemented to achieve Greece’s austerity targets.41
State funding for religions goes far beyond tax policy issues, and many other direct and 
indirect funding mechanisms are involved in Member States. Nevertheless, a market–oriented 
approach could also be applied in this larger context and on a national level, as an explanatory 
framework for legal adjustments, but also emerging practices and ongoing discussions on the 
‘good standards’ of state support for religions. 
 Here again, religious organizations 
are asked to be one among many economic players in a market society. 
Tax Policy and Financial Relationships between States and Religions before the 
European Court of Human Rights 
Addressing the issue of state support for religions in the light of the European Convention 
of Human Rights raises at the outset one obvious question: does this matter fall within the 
scope of the Convention? No doubt that the European Court is competent for applications 
pertaining to freedom of religion, guaranteed by Article 9 § 1. Moreover, and despite the 
margin of appreciation often granted to Member States to regulate religious matters within 
national borders,42 the Strasbourg Court no longer hesitates to take a stand against the national 
system of relationships between States and denominational groups and to align them with the 
requirements of the European Convention of Human Rights.43
In addition, state support takes on several forms, such as the use of tax instruments or 
direct or indirect funding through subsidies. An in-depth analysis shows that the main – and 
 
                                                          
41 Salles, Alain, ‘Orthodox Church appears to be exempt from austerity measures’, Guardian Weekly, 4 October 
2011. 
42 See Nigro, Raffaella (2010), ‘The margin of appreciation doctrine and the case-law of the European Court of 
human rights on the Islamic veil’, Human rights review, p. 531. 
43 See for example, Sviato-Mykhaïlivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, No. 77703/01 (ECHR, 14 June 2007), § 114 and § 
121, and Lang v. Autriche, No. 28648/03 (ECHR, 19 March 2009), § 24–5. 
even the sole – aspect dealt with by the Court is the tax legislation of the various domestic 
systems of state support for religions. As the European Court of Human Rights itself points 
out in its case law, the power of taxation in general is expressly recognized by the Convention 
and is ascribed to the State by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,44 concerning the protection of 
property.45
The European Court has a long tradition of dealing with tax issues related to religions: 
decisions have been regularly issued since the 1980s and they will require some elucidation in 
the context of the sample under study here. This sample comprises only sixteen cases, 
including four judgments and in the main decisions on admissibility
 The relevant provisions lie in section 2 of this article, allowing the States to 
‘secure the payment of taxes’. 
46. It should be noted that 
an overwhelming majority of applications have been declared inadmissible. The only three 
cases that confirmed a violation of the Convention47
                                                          
44 Precisely, this provides that: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No-one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall 
not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use 
of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.’ 
 are rather disappointing in that the 
45 See Commission (dec.), C. v. the United Kingdom, No. 10358/83 (ECHR, 15 December 1983); Court (dec.), 
Alujer Fernandez and Caballero Garcia v. Spain, No. 53072/99 (ECHR, 14 June 2001). 
46 See the list at the end of this paper. 
47 Darby v. Sweden, No. 11581/85 (ECHR, 23 October 1990); Jehovah’s witnesses v. France, No. 8916/05 
(ECHR, 30 June 2011). In the Darby case, the Court concludes that there was a violation of Article 14 combined 
with Article 1 Protocol 1, but without carrying out a real examination of the claim under Article 9. In addition, 
the violation relies on a lack of legitimate aim pursued by the Swedish legislation, the scope of which is very 
limited. In the same vein, the recent Association of Jehovah’s Witnesses case led to a decision confirming a 
violation of Article 9, but only because of the gifts received by the association being taxed under a law that was 
religious tax systems in question are either only a secondary consideration or are very much 
linked to national legislation. This limited amount of cases could be an illustration of the 
specificity of case law related to taxation based on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Indeed, most 
of the applications highlight the procedural aspects of national taxation processes, leaving 
limited space for Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken in conjunction with other substantive rights 
– opposed to procedural ones – of the Convention.48
Concerning specifically the combining of provisions related to religious issues – mainly 
Article 9 – and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, no real leading case can be found which would 
provide a framework for case law in this field. Nevertheless, what emerges from this small 
number of cases is the Court’s amazingly steadfast position, and its guidelines are worth 
examining. It seems that unshakeable protection is granted to State sovereignty in taxation 
and, furthermore, that the financial dimension of the system of Church–State relationships 
benefits from an important stability. 
 
Tax System and Religious Freedom before the European Court: the Reduced Protection of 
Freedom of Religion 
The tax system applicable to religious groups seems to offer nearly absolute power for 
state authorities to decide on how they should be taxed. In comparison, freedom of religion, 
negative or positive, seems to benefit from very limited protection and does so in several 
respects and under varying circumstances. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
too imprecise. In the Wasmuth v. Germany case (No. 12884/03, ECHR 17 February 2011), it is without doubt the 
difficulties surrounding negative freedom of religion raised by the application which eventually justified an 
examination of the merits. 
48 See Berger, Vincent (2010), ‘La jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et le droit fiscal’, 
Droit fiscal, No. 24, p. 367; Çoban, Ali Riza (2004), Protection of property rights within the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Aldershot: Ashgate), p. 218. 
The impression of reduced protection of freedom of religion firstly results from the Court 
very exceptionally accepting to consider taxation itself as interference in religious freedom, 
while freely admitting that taxation amounts to interference in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
Indeed, the Court seems much more cautious when religious taxation is at stake or when the 
applicants claim that taxation has an impact on their religious freedom. The impression 
prevails that taxation and the free exercise of freedom of religion are two separate processes, 
largely disconnected. This starts with the fact that tax cannot be characterized as a 
‘manifestation of one’s religion’49 and that ‘the obligation to pay taxes is a general one which 
has no specific conscientious implications in itself’.50 As a consequence, already in 1983 in 
the C. v. United Kingdom case, the Commission and then regularly the Court have stated that 
‘Article 9 does not confer on the applicant the right to refuse, on the basis of his convictions 
to abide by [tax] legislation’.51 Moreover, as considered in the Iglesia Bautista ‘El Salvador’ 
and José Aquilino Ortega Moratilla v. Spain case,52
                                                          
49 Court (dec.), Bruno v. Sweden, No. 32196/96 (ECHR, 28 August 2001). 
 ‘the right to freedom of religion by no 
means implies that churches or their adherents must be granted a different tax status from that 
of other taxpayers’. In addition, case law related to ‘prima facie neutral legislation’ applies 
50 Iglesia Bautista « El Salvador » and José Aquilino Ortega Moratilla v. Spain, No. 17522/90 (ECHR, 11 
January 1992). 
51 Commission (dec.), C. v. the United Kingdom, No. 10358/83 (ECHR, 15 December 1983); Commission (dec.), 
Hubaux v. Belgium, No. 11088/84 (ECHR, 9 May 1988). 
52 Iglesia Bautista « El Salvador » and José Aquilino Ortega Moratilla v. Spain, op. cit. The applicants argued 
that levying property tax infringes their freedom of religion set forth in Article 9. The commission holds 
however that it ‘fails to see how a right to exemption of places of worship from all forms of taxation can be 
derived from Article 9 of the Convention’. 
here, as is proven in the decision Skugar and others v. Russia.53 The applicants complained 
that they had been assigned taxpayer numbers which were incompatible with their religious 
beliefs.54
The sole possible evolution in case law linking taxation and freedom of religion could arise 
from situations in which taxation leads to material consequences in that it deprives the 
applicants of the concrete conditions of worship. As mentioned before, in the Iglesia Bautista 
‘El Salvador’ and José Aquilino Ortega Moratilla v. Spain case,
 The Court very clearly answered that ‘general legislation which applies on a neutral 
basis without any link whatsoever with an applicant’s personal beliefs cannot in principle be 
regarded as an interference with his or her rights under Article 9 of the Convention’. 
55
It should be noticed that, in this case, the application was declared inadmissible by a 
majority only, suggesting that some disagreement had occurred among the judges about the 
eventual decision. Since the Court does not provide dissenting opinions at the admissibility 
stage, it is difficult to know the underlying reasoning. In the 1992 case, the complaint was 
three-fold and, since both of the applicants’ arguments may be considered to be well-
established case law, one could suggest that the disagreement within the Commission could 
 the applicants argued that 
levying property tax infringes their freedom of religion set forth in Article 9. The Commission 
holds however that it ‘fails to see how a right to exemption of places of worship from all 
forms of taxation can be derived from Article 9 of the Convention. It considers that the right 
to freedom of religion by no means implies that churches or their adherents must be granted a 
different tax status from that of other taxpayers’. 
                                                          
53 Court (dec.), Skugar and others v. Russia, No. 40010/04 (ECHR, 3 December 2009). See also Vergos v. 
Greece, No. 65501/01 (ECHR, 24 September 2004), § 40. 
54 In the case at hand, the number in question contained three times ‘6’ and therefore corresponded to the image 
of the beast in Saint John’s apocalypse. 
55 Iglesia Bautista « El Salvador » and José Aquilino Ortega Moratilla v. Spain, op. cit. 
be explained by the alleged unequal treatment of the Catholic Church, which would infringe 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9. The intransigence of the Court gave way only 
recently in the 2011 Jehovah’s Witnesses v. France case, which throws new light on the 1992 
Spanish case. Indeed, although the eventual solution did not deal with this point, it seems that 
for the first time the Court recognizes in unambiguous terms that ‘the taxation imposed on the 
applicant had threatened, if not severely hindered, the internal organization and its 
functioning, given that, in particular, places of worship were targeted’ (§ 53).56
In addition, one observes an unequal balance between freedom of religion and religious 
organizations’ taxation rights. Although the Court commonly holds that no-one should be 
constrained to be involved in religious activities against one’s will, it remains shy when it 
comes to questioning the tax system. 
 
The case Bruno v. Sweden57
                                                          
56 Jehovah’s witnesses v. France, No. 8916/05 (ECHR, 30 June 2011). 
 could have us think and believe in the prospect of protection 
of the freedom of religion through Article 9 § 1 in taxation litigation. Indeed, in its reasoning, 
the Court includes the duty to pay church tax within the constraints of being involved in 
religious activities against one’s will. However, the Court combines this statement with the 
nuance that it is ‘in certain circumstances ‘ … a condition that was not met in this case. The 
applicant claimed that ‘the levying of church tax on him, who is not a member of the Church 
of Sweden, violated his freedom of religion as protected by Article 9 of the Convention’. His 
complaint was more precisely directed at the administration of burials, which the Church of 
Sweden is entrusted with. It should be specified that the sums levied by the Church of Sweden 
– at the time of application – were partly justified by the carrying out of certain tasks in the 
common interest, by the Church instead of public authorities. Non-members of the Church 
might be partially exempted from this tax. In addition, in this case, the reference to the Darby 
57 Court (dec.), Bruno v. Sweden, No. 32196/96 (ECHR, 28 August 2001). 
v. Sweden is only half convincing in that, although the Court concluded here that there was a 
violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, it drew this conclusion 
irrespectively of the religious background of the case. The impugned discrimination came 
from the illegitimate aim of the distinction between residents and non-residents in Sweden, 
and not from the distinction between members and non-members of the Church of Sweden. 
The applicant worked in Sweden, but lived in Finland. 
The protection of freedom of religion rests at first sight on the principle according to which 
‘a Church tax regime is not incompatible with the individual’s freedom of religion so long as 
he or she is free to leave the Church in question’.58 Nevertheless, the formalities of departure 
depend on the conditions fixed by the State. But this position is an old one, as the 
Commission already held in 1984 that ‘a requirement to pay a tax for belonging to a specific 
Church is not an interference with the exercise of freedom of religion where the law allows 
individuals to leave the Church’.59 It shows that from the moment a case deals with the heart 
of religious freedom, the Court could modify its position. The case Sukyo Mahikari v. France 
also dealt with the taxation of manual gifts, but, unlike the Jehovah’s Witnesses v. France 
case, the basis of taxation did not prevent the association from practising worship by 
depriving it of its places of worship.60
Negative freedom of religion is equally dealt with by the Court within this tax litigation 
context. In general, negative freedom of religion has a double meaning: it consists in the right 
to confess no religion or in the right not to be compelled to disclose one’s religious beliefs. It 
 
                                                          
58 Rivers, Julian (2010), The Law of organized Religions: between Establishment and Secularism (New York: 
Oxford University Press Inc), p. 61. 
59 Commission (dec.), E. v. Austria, No. 9781/82 (ECHR, 14 May 1984); see also Commission (dec.), 
Gottesmann v. Switzerland, No. 10616/83 (ECHR, 4 December 1984). 
60 Sukyo Mahikari v. France, No. 41729/09 (ECHR, 8 January 2013). 
appears that, connected to the taxation issue, the applicants complained that they had been led 
to reveal their religious beliefs while filling in their tax return. 
In the Spampinato v. Italy case, the applicant had decided to grant the State the eight 
thousandths of the amount due for income tax. Before the European Court of Human Rights, 
he complained under Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention that he had been obliged to reveal 
his religious convictions while drawing up his tax return. The Court rejected the argument, 
saying that the choice of assignment of income tax would necessarily involve revealing one’s 
belonging to a religious denomination. Indeed, the Court observes that, pursuant to Article 47 
§ 3 of Act No. 222 of 1985 – pertaining to the 0.8 per cent system – taxpayers can express 
their choice as to the assignment of sums thus perceived. In the Wasmuth v. Germany case,61
                                                          
61 Wasmuth v. Germany, No. 12884/03 (ECHR, 17 February 2011). 
 
the tax return was at issue against the backdrop of the German tax system. For some years, the 
applicant’s wage tax cards had included a section ‘Church Tax deducted’, which was left 
blank, thereby informing his employer that he did not have to deduct any Church Tax for Mr 
Wasmuth. He unsuccessfully asked the local authorities to provide him with a wage tax card 
disclosing no information related to his religious belonging. He lodged an appeal with various 
German courts arguing that this refusal amounted to a breach of his right not to disclose his 
religious opinions. The European Court concluded that there had not been a violation of 
Article 9 – notably for two reasons. As to whether the interference had been proportionate to 
the legitimate aim of ensuring the right of Churches and religious societies to levy religious 
tax, the European Court followed the German jurisdictions in thinking that the reference to the 
applicant’s religious or philosophical beliefs on the wage tax card had limited influence. 
Indeed, it only indicated to the fiscal authorities that he did not belong to one of the six 
churches of religious communities that can levy tax. In addition, the tax card is not publicly 
used and has no utility outside the relationship between employee and fiscal authorities. 
All this contributes to ensuring stability for the state support issue within the premises of 
systems of Church–State relationships. 
Impregnable Tax Sovereignty? 
The main statement likely to sum up the European Court's position here is that freedom of 
religion has limited impact on tax legislation enforcement, be it general and neutral legislation 
or religion-oriented tax legislation on the one hand, or positive or negative freedom of religion 
on the other hand. Indeed, the Strasbourg Court case law seemingly reflects the principle, 
according to which ‘tax sovereignty is a fundamental part of national sovereignty’.62
A wide margin of appreciation, the pillar of tax sovereignty 
 Before 
the European Court of Human Rights, this results in a wide margin of appreciation generally 
granted to Member States in deciding upon tax matters and the limited room granted to the 
principle of discrimination. 
In general, and like other European Union institutions, the Strasbourg Court is very 
cautious about evolving within the context of Church–State relationships.63
A historical inheritance, these relationships reflect a part of the deep identity of the States 
and lead to the subsidiarity of European systems. This is all the more visible when it comes to 
the tax system applicable to religious groups. The unchanged position of the European Court 
 Although freedom 
of religion undeniably benefits from protection through the enforcement of the European 
Convention by the Court, Member States nevertheless have an important margin of 
appreciation justified by the specificity of their relationships with Churches and religious 
groups. 
                                                          
62 Terra, Ben J.M. and Wattel, Peter J. (2005), European Tax Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), p. 3. 
63 In the relevant law section, it refers to Article 17 § 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
which provides that: ‘the Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and 
associations or communities in the Member States’. 
is summarized in the decision José Alujer Fernandez and Rosa Caballero Garcia c. 
Espagne:64
It seems that the freedom granted to the States when it comes to taxation questions is added 
to the traditional margin of appreciation usually left to the domestic authorities in religious 
matters. In the Spampinato case, the Court openly justifies the eventual solution by referring 
to its overall case law on state economical and tax policies.
 ‘such a margin of appreciation is all the more warranted in that there is no 
common European standard governing the financing of churches or religions, such questions 
being closely related to the history and traditions of each country.’ The Court has us 
understand that it does not intend to intrude into this exclusive domain of the States. Among 
several examples, the dissenting opinion of judges Berro-Lefèvre and Kalaydjieva following 
the case Wasmuth v. Germany should be considered here. Their criticism focuses on the 
analysis of negative freedom of religion adopted by the Court and they go to the trouble of 
expressing their adhesion to ‘the financing of churches as existing in Germany “and their” 
possibility to levy the Church Tax’ that ‘it is out of their purpose to question’. 
65
Such rooting in history is especially tangible when the Court is led to go into the details of 
Church–State relationship systems. In several countries, historically dominant Churches are in 
charge of social tasks pertaining to the general interest or public good. In this regard, litigation 
brought before the Strasbourg judges shows how the borders between the civil or religious 
nature of these tasks prove difficult to establish. The tasks thus carried out directly or 
indirectly benefit all citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs. In the Bruno v. Sweden 
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65 Gasus Dosier – und Fördertechnik GmbH v. Netherlands, No. 306–B, series A, p. 49 (ECHR, 23 February 
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case, ‘the Court agrees with the Government that the administration of burials, the care and 
maintenance of Church property and buildings of historic value and the care of old population 
records can reasonably be considered as tasks of a non-religious nature which are performed 
in the interest of society as a whole. It must be left to the State to decide who should be 
entrusted with the responsibility of carrying out these tasks and how they should be 
financed’.66
This case law allows a great stability of the domestic tax system. But the diversity of the 
status granted to religious denominations in various national Church–State relationship 
systems in Europe logically leads us to consider the discrimination argument, which very 
often form the basis of applicants’ claims before the Court. 
 In the same vein, the Iglesia Bautista ‘El Salvador’ and José Aquilino Ortega 
Moratilla v. Spain case justifies the differential treatment between the Catholic Church and 
other denominations on the grounds that the Catholic Church is entrusted with specific 
missions like the maintenance of cultural heritage, in the knowledge that ‘the Catholic Church 
has undertaken to place its historical, artistic and documentary heritage at the service of the 
Spanish people’. 
Impregnable case law? Power of taxation v. discrimination 
The question arises of whether this case law could remain apart from the now well-
established trend impacting all the European Union Member States, which consists in 
questioning of the current systems of state support for religious groups and activities in the 
light of the requirements of equality of treatment and the related principle of non-
discrimination. Indeed, the contemporary religious landscape is characterized by neutrality 
and pluralism, leading the States to the dilemma of funding no or all denominations to avoid 
discrimination on religious grounds. Will the principle of non-discrimination challenge the 
Strasbourg Court’s position on these premises? Or will the Court maintain the disconnection 
                                                          
66 Court (dec.), Bruno v. Sweden, No. 32196/96 (ECHR, 28 August 2001). 
between its case law on discrimination between religious denominations and its position 
regarding tax applied to individuals and denominational groups? 
In general, the position of the Court on the principle of non-discrimination rests on Article 
14 and consists in considering that ‘this provision does not prohibit all differences in 
treatment in the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized, equality of treatment being 
violated only where the difference in treatment has no objective and reasonable justification’ 
(a reference to ECHR, Belgian linguistic judgment of 9 February 1967). Hence, on the one 
hand, as noted above, the Court is much more attentive to the discrimination issue when it 
applies to religious denominations prevented from benefiting from the advantages normally 
granted to already established religious groups or from acceding to the same legal status as 
exists for them.67
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 On the other hand, very little room, if any, is given to the discrimination 
parameter in the case law under study here. Indeed, one observes that very regularly not only 
Article 9 is invoked but also Article 14, related to discrimination, taken together with Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1. The Strasbourg Court regularly, if not systematically, opposes the very 
important margin of appreciation allotted to the Member States in this respect. Its position is 
clearly expressed in the Alujer Fernandez v. Spain case: ‘Regard being had to the margin of 
appreciation left to Contracting States […] particularly as regards the building the fragile 
relations that exist between the State and religions, it cannot be considered as amounting to 
discriminatory interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion’. However, as 
noted above, within the sample under study here, three cases conclude that there was a 
violation of the Convention: Darby v. Sweden (1990), Jehovah’s witnesses v. France (2011) 
and Association Cultuelle du Temple Pyramide v. France (31 January 2013). In the Darby 
case, the Court precisely concludes that there was a violation of Article 14 combined with 
Article 1 Protocol No. 1, but without carrying out a real examination of the claim under 
Article 9. In addition, the violation relies on a lack of legitimate aim pursued by the Swedish 
legislation, the scope of which is very limited. Moreover, it should be noted that, in the 
Jehovah’s witnesses v. France case, the claim relating to discrimination had been overturned 
at the admissibility stage. Lastly, the range of French cases of January 2013 does not allow 
comparison, since the discrimination issue was not dealt with.68
The case Jehovas Zeugen in Österreich v. Austria
 
69
                                                          
68 Besides the case of Association Cultuelle du Temple Pyramide v. France, the Court delivered judgments on 
two other cases on a similar issue and with identical solutions; case Association des Chevaliers du Lotus d’or v. 
France, No. 50615/07 (ECHR, 31 January 2013), case Église Évangélique Missionnaire and Salaûn v. France, 
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 could announce a less clement position 
adopted by the Court towards the Member States, as it paves the way to a link between non-
discrimination requirements and tax law. The applicant was granted the status of religious 
society under the Religious Communities Act in May 2009. It claimed that before this date, as 
a mere religious community, it had been subject to laws concerning employees and tax from 
which it would have been exempt, had it been a recognized religious society and treated 
accordingly. In particular, it could have been exempt from inheritance and gift tax for a 
donation made to it in 1999. On this point, it invoked Article 14 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1. The Court deemed that there had been a violation of these provisions. The reason very 
likely lies in the fact that ‘the Government has not given any reason justifying the difference 
in treatment regarding the liability to inheritance and gift tax between the applicant 
community and religious communities recognized as religious societies and merely indicated 
that inheritance and gift tax had ceased to be collected after 31 July 2008’ (§ 47). Hence, the 
Court could only but apply the reasoning according to which a difference in treatment 
69 Jehovas Zeugen in Österreich v. Austria, No. 27540/05 (ECHR, 25 September 2012). 
between two religious groups cannot only depend on ‘whether or not the applicant community 
was a recognized religious society’ (§ 35–7 and 47–9). 
The question remains open about how these cases are likely to determine the orientation 
the Court has adopted so far. Should the Court follow this pathway, the consequences for the 
States could be serious. 
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